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AVOIDING THE PLANNED OBSOLESCENCE 
OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: CAN 
GENERAL EXCEPTION MECHANISMS BE 
IMPROVED, AND HOW? 
CAMILLE MARTINI* 
Abstract: In light of the increase in investor-state disputes brought by foreign 
investors under the arbitration clauses contained in international investment 
agreements (“IIAs”), treaty negotiators have started to develop safeguards in re-
cent IIAs in an attempt to mitigate the impact of these agreements on their regu-
latory powers. General exception clauses modeled on Article XX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are part of these new treaty provisions. General 
exceptions clauses are, in their current form, a source of uncertainty rather than 
coherence. Recent arbitration cases have shed light on the unworkable enforce-
ability requirements contained in general exceptions clauses, preventing, in 
most cases, these clauses from being successfully implemented. While narrow-
ing the scope of the standards of protection contained in IIAs may be a more ef-
fective path to improve the balance between protection of foreign investors’ 
rights and outcomes that promote good governance and sustainable develop-
ment, general exception clauses may nonetheless justify in very specific circum-
stances conduct that would otherwise represent a violation of the applicable IIA, 
in spite of the many interpretive issues contained therein. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although international investment agreements (“IIAs”) represent an 
effective mechanism to further the liberalization of regulatory frameworks 
and harmonize standards of protection for investors,1 they can also limit 
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 1 See, e.g., UNCTAD, INVESTMENT POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
31, 76, 79–80, 83 (2015), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3MCS-2Z9H]. 
IIAs are the primary public international law instruments governing the promotion 
and protection of foreign investments. . . . [M]ost IIAs combine similar (sometimes 
identical) treaty-based standards of promotion and protection for foreign investment 
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host countries’ policy space, or “right to regulate.” This is true especially in 
the fields of environmental protection, national security, public health, hu-
man rights, and energy transition.2 In anticipation of lengthy and costly in-
vestor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) proceedings, host countries could 
be deterred from implementing legitimate public policies when such poli-
cies could potentially impact foreign investors’ economic interests.3 
IIAs, by their very nature, contain a certain degree of asymmetry, giv-
en that only foreign investors may bring claims under them and thus only 
foreign investors benefit from the protection that they provide.4 Highly un-
balanced agreements, however, can undermine the current model of interna-
tional economic governance.5 On the one hand, IIAs have become powerful 
tools for foreign investors to challenge host governments’ regulations that 
conflict with their economic interests.6 On the other hand, one can seriously 
doubt whether traditional IIAs have succeeded in engaging with the social 
dimension of international investment flows.7  
Has the liberalization of foreign investment gone too far? Policymak-
ers, when implementing either general or targeted regulatory changes, face 
                                                                                                                           
with an investor-state arbitration mechanism that allows foreign investors to enforce 
these standards against host states. 
ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 1–2 (2009). 
 2 See S.A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Invest-
ment Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037, 1039 (2010). 
 3 This phenomenon has been described as a “regulatory chill.” See id. at 1039–40. 
 4 The fact that only foreign investors may bring a claim under the investor-state dispute reso-
lution provisions of an IIA should not impair a key purpose of IIAs that is “wider than just inves-
tor protection but covers attraction of and benefiting from foreign investment, which in turn con-
notes investment that is good for sustainable development.” Peter Muchlinski, General Exceptions 
in International Investment, Preface, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT 
LAW 351, 353 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE DE-
VELOPMENT]. Moreover, there is a possibility for host states, in specific circumstances, to bring 
counter-claims before investment tribunals. See, e.g., Stefan Dudas, Treaty Counterclaims Under 
the ICSID Convention, in ICSID CONVENTION AFTER 50 YEARS: UNSETTLED ISSUES 385, 385–
406 (Crina Baltag ed., 2016) (discussing examples of states bringing counterclaims against foreign 
investors in IIA disputes). 
 5 See Frank J. Garcia, Investment Treaties Are About Justice, COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES, No. 
185 (2016), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2034&context=lsfp [https:// 
perma.cc/SD7P-5CTK] (emphasizing the broader role of IIAs as “instruments of economic govern-
ance” rather than as merely existing to protect “private actor rights”). 
 6 See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 254–55 (4th 
ed. 2017). 
 7 See Frank J. Garcia et al., Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from Inter-
national Trade Law, 18 J. INT’L TRADE L. 861, 862, 867–69 (2015); Federico Ortino, The Social 
Dimension of International Investment Agreements: Drafting a New BIT/MIT Model?, 2008 OECD 
GLOBAL F. ON INT’L INV. 243, 243–44, http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311350.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X3JG-6YAF]. 
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a growing tension between their country’s domestic legal frameworks and 
international commitments under IIAs.8 Policymakers must determine how 
they can achieve a balanced integration between investment and non-
investment objectives and what substantive IIA reforms they could imple-
ment to achieve not only the protection of foreign investors’ rights, but also 
outcomes that promote good governance and sustainable development.9 The 
increasing insertion of general exception clauses (“GECs”) in IIAs—i.e. 
treaty provisions seeking to justify a host state’s conduct that would other-
wise qualify as a violation of the applicable IIA—are merely a result of 
these concerns.10 
Part I of this Essay will describe how the use of GECs, as part of a 
broader set of innovative investment treaty provisions, has increased in re-
cent years.11 Part II of this Essay will explain GECs’ unworkable enforcea-
bility requirements and argue that they are ill-adapted to justify violations of 
the fair and equitable treatment and expropriation standards.12 Finally, Part 
III of this Essay will explore other potential issues facing GECs and suggest 
some solutions to enable policymakers to better take into consideration 
these challenges in drafting the next generation of IIAs.13  
I. GENERAL EXCEPTION CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL  
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
Reconciling the objectives of GECs with the current development of 
ISDS is a complex undertaking. In light of the increase in investor-state 
disputes brought by foreign investors under the arbitration clauses con-
tained in IIAs, treaty negotiators have started to develop safeguards in re-
cent IIAs in an attempt to mitigate the impact of these agreements on their 
regulatory powers.14 The inclusion of new treaty provisions in IIAs also 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 6, at 219. 
 9 See Frank J. Garcia & Sebastián López Escarcena, Investment Law for the Twenty-First 
Century, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2595, 2603–04 Annex I (2018) (listing policy proposals for the reform 
of international investment law); see also Frank J. Garcia, 21st Century Investment Agreements: 
Justice, Governance and the Rule of Law, 12 PONTES 5 (2016), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2033&context=lsfp [https://perma.cc/M9J4-ZYD2]. 
 10 See infra notes 14–90 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–35 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 36–78 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Spears, supra note 2, at 1048–64 (describing new analytical devices included by states 
in recent IIAs). One reform action UNCTAD was to provide was for the “amend[ment of] treaty 
provisions,” which involves the “modifi[cation of] an existing treaty’s content by introducing new 
provisions or altering or removing existing ones.” U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD IN-
VESTMENT REPORT, at 131, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2017, U.N. Sales No. E. 17. II. D. 3 (2017) 
[hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017]. 
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seeks to improve the interactions between domestic regulatory measures 
and international law. Although domestic legal frameworks may be part of 
the applicable law in a given investment case, the regulatory actions of a 
host state may be perceived, subject to the wording of the applicable IIA, as 
not being part of the applicable law, but as factual considerations reviewed 
by the arbitral tribunal in assessing the lawfulness of a host country’s 
measures under international law—most often in investment arbitration the 
treaty upon which the claim is based.  
This reasoning partly explains why IIAs are deemed to limit host coun-
tries’ right to regulate. Legitimate public policies, such as environmental or 
health measures, are implemented through domestic regulations either of a 
general nature (such as the decision to prohibit certain products deemed 
dangerous for human health) or targeted to a single investor or situation 
(such as the withdrawal of a license). This in turn will be assessed against 
the standards of treatment contained in the applicable IIA, such as the 
standards of Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET”),15 Most-Favored Nation 
(“MFN”),16 National Treatment (“NT”),17 or the protection against unlawful 
expropriation. By inserting clauses seeking to safeguard some level of regu-
latory space, host states not only aim to decrease the likelihood that chal-
lenges will be brought against legitimate public interest measures, but also 
seek to improve the interplay between domestic regulatory measures and 
their respective commitments under international law. 
As noted by UNCTAD, although “old treaties” still represent the majori-
ty of IIAs in force today,18 many new IIAs contain sustainable development 
                                                                                                                           
 15 The FET standard is one of the most important standards of treatment in IIAs. See NEW-
COMBE & PARADELL, supra note 1, at 255 (“IIA tribunals have interpreted fair and equitable 
treatment as providing a wide range of procedural and substantive protections, including the pro-
tection of legitimate expectations.”). 
 16 MFN treatment obligations in international investment law “require[s] that state conduct 
does not discriminate between similarly situated persons, entities, goods, services or investments 
of different foreign nationalities.” NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 1, at 193. 
 17 A NT clause is defined as “[a] provision contained in some treaties . . . according foreigners 
the same rights . . . as those accorded to nationals.” National-Treatment Clause, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). “The purpose of the national treatment obligation in IIAs is to pro-
hibit nationality-based discrimination by the host state between the host states’ investors and in-
vestments and those of another IIA party.” NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 1, at 150–51. 
 18 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 14, at xii. According to UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report 2017, “old” investment treaties (signed before 2010) represent 95% of the IIAs 
in force today.” Id. These treaties “bite,” according to UNCTAD, given that by the end of 2016, 
“virtually all of the known treaty-based ISDS cases had been filed pursuant to treaties concluded 
before 2010, which typically feature broad and vague formulations and include few exceptions or 
safeguards.” Id. This prompted the launch of phase two of UNCTAD’s Roadmap for IIA Reform, 
aimed at “modernizing the existing stock of old-generation treaties.” UNCTAD, Phase 2 of IIA 
Reform: Modernizing the Existing Stock of Old-Generation Treaties, IIA ISSUES NOTE, June 2017, 
at 1. UNCTAD presented and analyzed several options for Phase 2 of IIA reform: 
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minded elements.19 Provisions inserted in IIAs to safeguard host countries’ 
regulatory space include: (i) references in the preamble to provide guidance 
to tribunals when interpreting treaty provisions;20 (ii) clauses explicitly refer-
ring to a host state’s right to regulate; (iii) exclusions and language clarifica-
tions;21 and (iv) GECs, often modeled on the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”) Article XX and, more generally, any mechanism used to 
justify a conduct that would otherwise qualify as a violation of the IIA.22 In 
                                                                                                                           
(1) jointly interpreting treaty provisions; (2) amending treaty provisions; (3) replac-
ing “outdated” treaties; (4) consolidating the IIA network; (5) managing relation-
ships between coexisting treaties; (6) referencing global standards; (7) engaging 
multilaterally; (8) abandoning unratified old treaties; (9) terminating existing old 
treaties; and (10) withdrawing from multilateral treaties. Countries can adapt and 
adopt these options to pursue the reforms set out in the Road Map in line with their 
policy priorities. 
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 14, at xii. 
 19 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 14, at 119. 
 20 Id. at 122. According to UNCTAD, although only 8% of earlier IIAs (1959–2010) con-
tained references to health and safety, labor rights, environment or sustainable development in 
their preambles, this ratio has increased to 56% in most recent BITs (2011–2016). See id.  
 21 See Camille Martini, Balancing Investors’ Rights with Environmental Protection in Inter-
national Investment Arbitration: An Assessment of Recent Trends in Investment Treaty Drafting, 
50 INT’L LAW. 529, 574–76 (2017) (discussing language clarifications and exclusions in recent 
IIAs). These exclusions do not include certain measures from the scope of a given provision or 
from the entire scope of the treaty, thereby limiting the extent to which regulatory measures can 
result in a violation of the standards of protection. Relevant examples of exclusions include the 
Essential Security Exception clause contained in the North American Free Trade Agreement as 
well as the taxation carve-out contained in Article 21(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty. See North 
American Free Trade Agreement, art. 2102, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 [herein-
after NAFTA]; Energy Charter Treaty, art. 21(1), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ECT]. 
For an example of a language clarification, in the context of an indirect expropriation clause, see 
Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion, Protection, and Liberalisa-
tion of Investment, Annex IV, Japan-Peru, Nov. 21, 2008, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/
peru/agree0811.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3EF-WKW5]. Language clarifications can also take the 
form of more carefully drafted definitions of covered investment or investor. See WORLD IN-
VESTMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 14, at 122. 
 22 Mark Wu, The Scope and Limits of Trade’s Influence in Shaping the Evolving International 
Investment Regime, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING 
THEORY INTO PRACTICE 169, 198 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014). Some provisions, although 
labeled as general exceptions, do not seek to justify conduct that would otherwise qualify as a 
violation of the IIA, but merely reaffirm the host state’s ability to implement measures that are 
consistent with the treaty. Given their limited impact in practice, these provisions may be assimi-
lated to those reaffirming the host state’s right to regulate. See, for instance, Annex I, Section 
III(1) of the Canada-Peru BIT. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Govern-
ment of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Annex 1, Can.-Peru, Mar. 18, 
1998, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/626 [https://perma.cc/RUE2-
LX8Z] (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopt-
ing, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it con-
siders appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sen-
sitive to environmental concerns.”). The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
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addition, there is a theory that host states could introduce their legitimate ex-
pectations in IIAs to balance the interests of both host states and investors.23 
To illustrate these new trends, recent model bilateral investment treaties 
(“BITs”) published in 2015 by Brazil,24 Norway,25 and India,26 contain inno-
vative features that will be used as the basis for upcoming treaty negotiations, 
possibly shaping the practice of tomorrow’s international investment law.27 
A recent increase in the occurrence of GECS poses many interpretive 
and theoretical challenges.28 As such, for the sake of concision, this Essay 
                                                                                                                           
Disputes had an opportunity to clarify the meaning of this provision in Infinito Gold Ltd. v. Repub-
lic of Costa Rica. See ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 358 (Dec. 4, 2017) 
(“As is obvious from its plain language quoted above, this provision sets out guidelines regarding 
the content of measures that may be adopted, maintained or enforced by the host state. It does not 
relate to the State’s consent to arbitrate, nor to whether a claim can be heard or not; it relates to 
whether a particular measure has or has not breached the BIT. Accordingly, it cannot be deemed a 
matter of jurisdiction or admissibility; it must properly be regarded as a matter for the merits.”). A 
tribunal has nonetheless given a greater interpretive weight to a similar clause, noting:  
[The] principle [of a state’s police powers to enforce existing laws] is given even 
greater force in the present context by Article 10.10 of the US–Oman FTA, which, it 
will be recalled, provides specifically that neither party shall be constrained from 
“enforcing any measure . . . it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activi-
ty in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.” 
Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, ¶ 445 
(Nov. 3, 2015). 
 23 See Karl P. Sauvant & Güneş Ünüvar, Can Host Countries Have Legitimate Expectations?, 
COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES, No. 183, at 2 (2016). This theory could help mitigate the asymmetry 
in IIAs standards of protections, but it needs to be further explored as it has only been discussed 
by two scholars. See id. (discussing the theory of using states’ legitimate expectations in balancing 
IIAs). 
 24 See Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement Between the Federative Republic 
of Brazil and [Country] (2015), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4786 
[https://perma.cc/9WR6-Q6JK] (Brazil Model BIT). 
 25 See Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and [Country] for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments (2015), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3350 
[https://perma.cc/PH2A-CD7X] (Norway Model BIT). 
 26 See Bilateral Investment Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of India and [Coun-
try] (2015), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3560 [https://perma.cc/
CCA7-S845] (India Model BIT). 
 27 In fact, Brazil’s Model BIT has led to the incorporation of similar provisions in subsequent 
investment treaties. See, e.g., Agreement for Cooperation and Facilitation of the Investments Be-
tween the Federative Republic of Brazil and the United States of Mexico, Braz.-Mex., May 26, 
2015, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4718 [https://perma.cc/6PP6-
WD68]; Investment and Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement Between the Federative Repub-
lic of Brazil and the Republic of Chile, Braz.-Chile, Nov. 24, 2015, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4712 [https://perma.cc/B2AU-6PCZ].  
 28 See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 14, at 119 (“A review of 18 IIAs con-
cluded in 2016 for which texts are available . . . shows that most of them include provisions safe-
guarding the right to regulate for sustainable development objectives . . . . Of these 18 agreements, 
9 have general exception—for example, for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 
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will focus on the implementation of GECs modeled on Article XX of the 
GATT,29 which raise many interpretive issues not yet analyzed by arbitral 
case law.30 Other mechanisms, such as exclusions, or “carve-out” provi-
sions,31 will be evoked for comparison purposes.  
International law practitioners have increasingly acknowledged the 
benefit of GECs in IIAs.32 Nevertheless, doubts regarding the actual added 
value of these provisions in practice remain. These critiques include: (i) the 
risk that extensive phrasing could enable host states to implement protec-
tionist measures; (ii) the risk that GECs fall short of providing additional 
regulatory flexibility to implement public policy measures; (iii) the fact that 
arbitral tribunals have to some extent already incorporated host states’ right 
to regulate in the interpretation of traditional standards of protection;33 in 
sum, that GECs are redundant,34 create uncertainty in investment disputes, 
and may even render inoperative existing safeguards as construed by the 
arbitral practice.35 
                                                                                                                           
or the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Another 11 explicitly recognize that the 
parties should not relax health, safety or environmental standards to attract investment; and 12 
refer to the protection of health and safety, labour rights, the environment or sustainable develop-
ment in their preambles.” (emphasis added)). 
 29 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 20, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 (“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health. . . .”). 
 30 See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 1, at 503. 
 31 See generally Caroline Henckels, Scope Limitations or Affirmative Defenses: The Purpose 
and Role of Investment Treaty Exception Clauses, in EXCEPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Fed-
erica Paddeu & Lorand Bartels eds.) (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2801950 (discussing the purpose and use of exemption clauses and carve-outs). 
 32 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. But see SORNARAJAH, supra note 6, at 262–63. 
 33 See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003) (recalling the “due deference [owed] to the 
State when defining the issues that affect its public policy or the interests of society as a whole,” 
and determining of whether such measures were “reasonable with respect to their goals, the depri-
vation of economic rights and the legitimate expectations of who suffered such deprivation”); see 
also Martini, supra note 21, at 581–82. New provisions inserted in IIAs and the solutions devel-
oped by several tribunals have common features, such as the implementation of a proportionality 
test to balance host states’ public interest and the assessment of the impact on the investor’s inter-
ests. See ARNAUD DE NANTEUIL, L’EXPROPRIATION INDIRECTE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE 
L’INVESTISSEMENT 482–89 (2014). 
 34 See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA No. 2012-2, Award, 
¶ 6.67 (Mar. 15, 2016) (noting the inapplicability of a GEC in the Canada-Ecuador BIT that had 
been modeled on Article XX of the GATT). 
 35 See Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/2, Award, 
¶¶ 473–474 (Nov. 30, 2017). In Bear Creek Mining Corp., the tribunal stated: 
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Despite the scarcity of arbitral cases applying GECs, some recent cases 
have shed light on how tribunals would interpret the clauses, and what hur-
dles these provisions may face before being successfully implemented. This 
article will discuss practical aspects of the implementation of general excep-
tions in the context of an alleged violation of the standard of fair and equi-
table treatment and the protection against expropriation. It will seek to 
demonstrate that, although general exceptions often require the host country 
to refrain from any discriminatory or arbitrary behavior in order to be appli-
cable, this requirement is ill-adapted to violations of the FET and expropria-
tion standards, rendering the provision inoperative in most cases. The extent 
to which GECs can successfully be applied will also be analyzed. By identi-
fying the potential implementation challenges that face GECs, this article 
aims to enable policymakers to better take into consideration these chal-
lenges in order to negotiate more effective general exception mechanisms, 
avoiding the anticipated obsolescence of modern IIAs. 
II. THE NON-ARBITRARY AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT 
REQUIREMENT OF GENERAL EXCEPTION CLAUSES IS ILL-ADAPTED  
TO THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT AND  
EXPROPRIATION STANDARDS 
General exceptions modeled on Article XX of the GATT usually allow a 
host state to justify, in limited subject areas, conduct that would otherwise 
represent a violation of the treaty as long as said conduct is non-discrimina-
tory, and not a disguised restriction on investment or trade.36 Similarly to 
what has been developed in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) frame-
                                                                                                                           
[T]he list [contained in the general exception clause of the applicable FTA] is not in-
troduced by any wording (e.g. “such as”) that could be understood that it is only ex-
emplary. It must therefore be understood to be an exclusive list . . . . [T]he interpre-
tation of the FTA must lead to the conclusion that no other exceptions from general 
international law or otherwise can be considered applicable in this case. 
Id. ¶ 473. On this basis the tribunal found that the police powers exception was not applicable: 
“There is, thus, no need to enter into the discussion between the Parties regarding the jurispru-
dence concerning any police power exception for measures addressed to investments.” Id. ¶ 474. 
 36 See, e.g., Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Can., art. 10., https://www.italaw.com/
documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ6H-CQC6] (“Subject to the 
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between investments or between investors, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Party from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: (a) to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; (b) to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this Agreement; or (c) for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural 
resources.”). 
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work,37 arbitral tribunals must follow a two-step analysis to determine the 
applicability of similar general exceptions. First, the measure must fulfill 
the requirements contained in the article’s “chapeau” (for example, not rep-
resenting an “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” between investors or 
investments,38 or not being applied in an “arbitrary or unjustifiable man-
ner”).39 Second, the measure must be necessary to meet one of the enumerat-
ed exceptions, meaning that there would be no other alternative to fulfill the 
policy objective.40 The requirement that a measure is non-arbitrary and non-
discriminatory represents in the international investment law framework an 
important hurdle that prevents, in most cases, the GECs from being success-
fully implemented by arbitral tribunals, thus limiting the potential impact of 
these clauses in practice. 
A. General Exception Clauses and the Fair and Equitable  
Treatment Standard 
The first limitation of GECs in the context of the FET standard is that 
the requirement of non-discrimination and non-arbitrariness prevents excep-
tions from being applied to justify a measure that would fall below the min-
imum standard of treatment prescribed under customary international law.41 
In 2009, in Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, the tribunal 
defined the content of the minimum standard of treatment with reference to 
the 1926 case of L.F.H. Near v. United Mexican States.42 It is quite easy to 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See World Trade Organization Secretariat, WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: GATT 
Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_
exceptions_e.htm [https://perma.cc/W3Y6-K8J7] (emphasizing the two-step process required under 
Article XX of the GATT); see also Spears, supra note 2, at 1062–63 (summarizing the WTO Appel-
late Body’s approach to interpreting GECs). 
 38 See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, ch. VII, E.U.-Viet., Sept. 24, 2018, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=
1437 [https://perma.cc/X92L-J82J]. 
 39 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of 
Ecuador for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, art. XVII, Can.-Ecuador, 
Apr. 29, 1996, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/609 [https://perma.cc/
82Z3-D9KY] [hereinafter Canada-Ecuador BIT]. 
 40 See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 1, at 505; NAFTA, supra note 21, art. 1102. 
 41 Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International Investment, in SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 351, 369. 
 42 See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 616 (June 8, 
2009) (referencing L.F.H. Near v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Claims 
Comm’n 1926) (stating “the fundamentals of the Neer standard thus still apply today: to violate 
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment codified in Article 1105 of the 
[NAFTA], an act must be sufficiently egregious and shocking—a gross denial of justice, manifest 
arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a mani-
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understand, in light of this definition of the minimum standard of treatment, 
why GECs could not be successfully applied in cases where this minimum 
standard is breached. As general exceptions only come into play after a find-
ing that a measure is contrary to the treaty standard (here, the FET standard 
construed as the minimum standard of treatment), the finding of a violation 
would automatically preclude the application of an exception clause. In other 
words, if an exception may produce effects only if a state’s behavior is non 
arbitrary and non-discriminatory, one may hardly see how the exception 
could apply to justify a behavior with the precise attribute of, in the words 
of the Glamis Gold Ltd. tribunal, being a “manifest arbitrariness, blatant 
unfairness, complete lack of due process or evident discrimination.”43 In 
any case, it may not be desirable (or achievable) for a host country to justify 
resorting to a general exception mechanism to permit conduct that would 
otherwise be a violation of the minimum standard of treatment to foreigners 
under customary international law. 
Upon a finding that the FET standard is equivalent to the minimum 
standard of treatment,44 a GEC found in the applicable IIA cannot be in-
voked to justify a violation of the FET standard. Where the tribunal holds 
otherwise, i.e. that under the applicable IIA, the FET standard is broader 
than the minimum standard of treatment,45 or that the standard itself has 
evolved,46 there is a possibility that a GEC could permit conduct that would 
otherwise be prohibited by treaty. The exception clause would not impact 
the tribunal’s interpretation of the FET standard as such, but would rather 
prevent the tribunal from applying a broad interpretation of this standard to 
the particular public policy measure at stake. In this situation, an exception 
clause could well be applied to justify a measure that would otherwise consti-
tute a violation of the FET standard when the arbitral tribunal would give the 
                                                                                                                           
fest lack of reasons—so as to fall below accepted international standards and constitute a breach 
of Article 1105(1)”)). 
 43 Id. 
 44 See, e.g., El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Award, ¶ 337 (Oct. 31, 2011); Glamis Gold, Ltd., ¶ 616; Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)05/02 (NAFTA), Award, ¶¶ 284, 286 (Sept. 18, 2009); Rumeli Tele-
kom A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 611 (July 29, 2008); 
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Award, ¶ 592 (July 24, 2008). 
 45 See, e.g., Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 7.4.7 (Aug. 20, 2007); Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Repub-
lic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 258 (May 22, 2007); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Repub-
lic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 368 (July 24, 2006); Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. 
v. United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 194 (Jan. 26, 2006). 
 46 See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 299 
(Feb. 6, 2007). 
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standard a broader acceptation, for instance encompassing the protection of 
the investor’s legitimate expectations47 or the requirements of transparency 
or proportionality.48 In any event, the tribunal’s finding that the measures at 
issue are discriminatory or arbitrary would prevent the successful imple-
mentation of the exception.49 
Paradoxically, the effective implementation of GECs in the context of 
FET violations would require a tribunal, after adopting a broad interpreta-
tion of this standard, to then refrain from implementing a restrictive ap-
proach in the assessment of the GEC. 
B. General Exception Clauses in Expropriation Cases 
The high threshold GECs impose may present difficulties regarding (i) 
their application in cases of unlawful expropriations for lack of due process, 
lack of public interest or discriminatory treatment, even where one of the 
enumerated exceptions (e.g., the protection of human, animal, or plant life) 
is present; and (ii) their effect, on the amount to be paid in case of unlawful 
expropriations for lack of compensation only. 
First, as illustrated by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) 
case Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, brought pursuant to the Canada-
Ecuador BIT of 1996,50 the requirement of a non-discriminatory and non-
arbitrary measure contained in the “chapeau” of the article may preclude the 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶ 222 (July 30, 2010) (defining legitimate expecta-
tions as “certain expectations about the nature of the treatment that [the investor] may anticipate 
from the host State”); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 69 (Mar. 21, 2007) (evoking the “legitimate expectations generated as a 
result of the investor’s dealings with the competent authorities of the host State . . . .”); Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A., ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003) (referring to the “basic expectations that 
were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment”); CME Czech Republic 
B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 611 (Sept. 13, 2001) (holding that changes 
to the [television industry’s] regulatory framework of the host state constituted an “evisceration of 
the arrangements in reliance upon [which] the foreign investor was induced to invest”). 
 48 See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, 
Award, ¶¶ 402–404 (Oct. 5, 2012); Cargill, Inc., ¶ 511. 
 49 In addition, a GEC would arguably fall short of justifying a violation of the FET standard 
for breach of good faith. See, e.g., UAB E Energija (Lithuania) v. Republic of Latvia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/12/33, Award, ¶ 839 (Dec. 22, 2017) (holding that good faith is generally regarded as a 
fundamental part of the FET standard of protection). 
 50 See Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-2, Award 
(Mar. 15 2016). After Ecuador had initiated annulment proceedings before the District Court of 
The Hague and Copper Mesa Mining Corp. had filed a petition to confirm the award in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, the two parties entered into a settlement agreement on 
July 19, 2018, pursuant to a joint motion dated July 25, 2018. See generally Copper Mesa Mining 
Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, No. 1:17-cv-0394 (TNM) (D.D.C. July 25, 2018). 
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application of the exception clause in cases of expropriation where the re-
quirements of due process and/or of a non-discriminatory measure have not 
been met.51 
The Copper Mesa Mining Corp. case arose from the Republic of Ec-
uador’s termination of three concession contracts (respectively situated at 
Junín, Chaucha and Telimbela, in Ecuador).52 The claimant in the case argued 
that the Republic of Ecuador had unlawfully revoked or terminated the con-
tracts, thereby violating its international obligations under the FET, full pro-
tection and security, NT, and expropriation standards contained in the BIT.53 
The Republic of Ecuador specifically argued that the contested measures 
(the 2008 Mining Mandate, the 2009 Mining Law, and the Termination 
Resolutions) were a justified exercise of its police powers and part of a le-
gitimate reform of its mining legal framework.54 The measures, according 
to the tribunal, did not constitute an expropriation.55 Ecuador argued that, 
even if these measures were, in effect, expropriation, they did not qualify as 
breaches of the IIA because they fell under the general exception provided 
by Article XVII(3) of the BIT.56 Copper Mesa Mining Corp. is the first re-
ported investment case in which the host state articulated a defense based 
on a GEC inserted in the applicable IIA.57 The claimant answered that the 
host state’s measures were applied “in an arbitrary and unjustifiable man-
                                                                                                                           
 51 Canada-Ecuador BIT, supra note 39, art. XVII (“Provided that such measures are not ap-
plied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contract-
ing Party from adopting or maintaining measures, including environmental measures: (a) neces-
sary to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Agreement; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or (c) relating to 
the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.” (emphasis added)). A simi-
lar conclusion would most likely be reached in case of a violation of the MFN and NT standards, 
as such violation would imply a finding of a discriminatory action. 
 52 Copper Mesa Mining Corp., ¶ 1.8. 
 53 Id. ¶ 1.71. 
 54 Id. ¶ 6.2. 
 55 Id. ¶ 6.9 (holding “it is well established under international law that a non-discriminatory 
regulation, adopted for a public purpose and enacted in accordance with due process, does not 
amount to expropriation, and even less, to unfair and inequitable treatment”). 
 56 Id. ¶ 6.14. 
 57 Jarrod Hepburn, In-Depth: In Copper Mesa Case, Jurisdictional Objections Were Waved 
Away; Ecuador Breaches BIT Due to Failure to Protect Investor from Protesters, IA REPORTER 
(June 5, 2016), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/in-depth-in-copper-mesa-case-jurisdictional-
objections-were-waved-away-ecuador-breaches-bit-due-to-failure-to-protect-investor-from-
protesters/ [https://perma.cc/GS94-RU4V] (“Notably, the Copper Mesa case appears to be the first 
in which a state has sought to rely on a general exceptions clause, which—although relatively 
often found in Canada’s BITs—remain otherwise rare.”). 
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ner” and that, as a consequence, the GEC was inapplicable to its claims for 
expropriation.58 
The Copper Mesa Mining Corp. tribunal, reaching the assessment of 
the lawfulness of the measure at hand, found that the expropriation was un-
lawful given that it: (i) amounted to substantial deprivation;59 (ii) was 
“made in an arbitrary manner and without due process”;60 and (iii) was ef-
fectuated without providing compensation to the investor.61 Following the 
finding that the expropriation was unlawful, the tribunal turned to the 
GEC’s application, the Republic of Ecuador’s subsidiary argument. After 
characterizing the state’s measures as “made in an arbitrary manner and 
without due process,” the Tribunal concluded that the GEC contained in 
Article XVII(3) of the Canada-Ecuador BIT was inapplicable “given its in-
troductory proviso,”62 provided that only measures not “applied in an arbi-
trary or unjustifiable manner”63 could fall within the scope of the exception. 
Copper Mesa Mining Corp. illustrates that GECs are ill-adapted to 
provide a carve-out in case of expropriation measures that violate the due 
process requirement of a lawful expropriation. The case also provides sup-
port to a similar conclusion in situations where the expropriation measure is 
discriminatory or not taken in the public interest. It seems doubtful that a 
tribunal could hold that an expropriation measure, deemed unlawful be-
cause it discriminated against a foreign investor, could still fulfill the re-
quirements of the exception clause and thus be considered as not applied in 
an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner. Moreover, if the expropriation measure 
was not taken in the public interest, it is not the “chapeau” itself that would 
prevent the GEC’s application, but the second requirement contained in the 
exception clause—that the unlawful measure be necessary to meet one of 
the enumerated public policy concerns.64 The “public interest” condition of 
a lawful expropriation is arguably broader than the closed list of public pol-
icy concerns contained in the exception clause; therefore it is again doubtful 
that an expropriation measure deemed unlawful could ever fulfill the public 
policy requirement of the exception clause. 
In the context of an unlawful expropriation, the absence of one of three 
conditions of a lawful expropriation (i.e., public interest, due process and 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Copper Mesa Mining Corp., ¶ 6.17. 
 59 Id. ¶ 6.59. 
 60 Id. ¶ 6.56 (“[T]he Termination Resolutions were implemented . . . without any effective 
opportunity for the Claimant to appeal . . . before any administrative or judicial organ competent 
to hear and decide such an appeal on its merits within the Ecuadorian legal system.”). 
 61 Id. ¶ 6.67. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Canada-Ecuador BIT, supra note 39, art. XVII. 
 64 See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
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non-discrimination) almost automatically precludes the application of a 
GEC.65 On the one hand, it seems legitimate that exception mechanisms 
could not act to justify an otherwise discriminatory or arbitrary behavior by 
the host state. On the other hand, the Copper Mesa Mining Corp. case illus-
trates that an arbitral tribunal could easily find a GEC inapplicable based on 
the threshold contained in its “chapeau”.66 The Copper Mesa Mining Corp. 
tribunal, indeed, found a violation of due process; the explanations provided 
by the tribunal, however, were rather succinct.67 What meaning should be 
given to the non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary behavior contained in the 
exception, and is it necessarily the same meaning as the due process re-
quirement of an expropriation? The tribunal provided no explanation what-
soever, did not draw any parallel with WTO case law, and did not even in-
terpret the exception clause before qualifying it as “inapplicable.”68 In this 
respect, the case illustrates that tribunals have extensive discretion to make 
determinations on the application of the GECs. For instance, in cases of 
targeted measures (such as the withdrawal of a license or a concession) for 
motives peculiar to a given investor, it is uncertain how tribunals would as-
sess whether such behavior is discriminatory, arbitrary, or unjustifiable. This 
reinforces the idea that general exception mechanisms contained in future 
investment treaties need to be carefully drafted and tailored to the specificities 
of investment law, instead of being imported “as is” from trade law. 
Another difficulty GECs caused in cases of unlawful expropriations 
concerns the scope of their application. More specifically, the concern was 
whether these provisions could provide a basis to exclude the qualification 
of an act as expropriatory altogether or, at most, render an otherwise unlaw-
ful expropriation lawful.69 
One practical consequence of this uncertainty surrounding the scope of 
exception clauses relates to the question of compensation in unlawful ex-
propriations. It seems doubtful that a GEC could completely relieve a state 
of any obligation to pay an investor compensation in case of expropria-
tion.70 As explained below, however, these clauses could play a key role in 
                                                                                                                           
 65 The fourth condition traditionally contained in IIAs, the payment of compensation, is dis-
cussed below. See infra 74–82 and accompanying text. 
 66 See Copper Mesa Mining Corp., ¶ 6.67. 
 67 See id. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See Martini, supra note 21, at 580. 
 70 See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 1, at 505–06 (stating “[i]t would be surprising if, 
by effect of general exceptions, parties to IIAs intended to provide less protection to foreign inves-
tors that that accorded under customary international law; thus if the exception does not prevent a 
finding of expropriation (because the measure is a direct expropriation) presumably it cannot ex-
clude payment for compensation”). 
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reducing the amount paid by excluding the possibility that the host state 
must provide for reparation under customary international law. 
There is a growing trend in investment cases to grant full reparation 
under customary international law upon a finding of unlawful expropriation, 
instead of “compensation” as required in the applicable IIA.71 The common 
rationale is that treaty provisions on compensation only describe the stand-
ard of compensation in case of lawful expropriation and do not define the 
standard in case of unlawful expropriation.72 Several tribunals and scholars 
have expressed a contrary view: that the treaty standard for compensation 
should be applied in any circumstances, regardless of whether the expropri-
ation was found lawful or not by the tribunal.73 According to this view, the 
treaty standard is construed as lex specialis, applicable in all cases of ex-
propriation, and therefore preempts the application of international custom-
                                                                                                                           
 71 See IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 78–79 (2d ed., 2017) (“Recent practice of international investment 
tribunals has also come to the same conclusion [including an increase in value of unlawfully ex-
propriated property]. It appears that the distinction between ‘compensation’ for lawful expropria-
tion and ‘damages’ for unlawful expropriations becomes increasingly more accepted. The ICSID 
Tribunal in ADC v. Hungary, for instance, . . . pointed out that, in cases of unlawful expropria-
tions, the standard of compensation contained in the applicable investment protection treaty [was] 
not decisive but, instead, customary international law should be applied . . . . Similarly, the ICSID 
Tribunal in Siemens v. Argentina emphasized the difference between compensation and damages 
in expropriation cases and clarified its importance . . . . The idea that compensation is due in case 
of lawful expropriations and damages in case of unlawful expropriations, thus seems to gain 
ground in recent investment arbitration practice.”); see also Meg Kinnear, Damages in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A 
GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 551, 557–60 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010). 
 72 See, e.g., Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Deci-
sion on Reconsideration and Award, ¶ 160 (Feb. 7, 2017) (“The appropriate standard of compen-
sation in this case [of unlawful expropriation] is the customary international law standard of full 
reparation. Article III(1) only describes the conditions under which an expropriation is considered 
lawful; [and] it does not set out the standard of compensation for expropriations resulting from 
breaches of the Treaty.”); Quiborax S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/2, Award, ¶ 326 (Sept. 16, 2015); Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federa-
tion, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227, Final Award, ¶¶ 1758–1759, 1826 (July 18, 2014); 
ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/
30, Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits, ¶¶ 342–343 (Sept. 3, 2013); ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Repub-
lic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 481 (Oct. 6, 2006). 
 73 See, e.g., Sistem Mühendislik In aat Sanayi ve Ticaret A. v. Kyrgyz Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/06/1, Award, ¶¶ 121, 156 (Sept. 9, 2009); Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, 
S.A., ¶¶ 187, 189; Middle East Cement Shipping & Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, ¶ 107 (Apr. 12, 2002); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶ 118 (Dec. 8, 2000); Audley Sheppard, The Distinc-
tion Between Lawful and Unlawful Expropriation, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENER-
GY CHARTER TREATY 169, 196–97 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006); see also Christina L. Beharry, 
Lawful Versus Unlawful Expropriation: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose, in 9 INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 185, 192 (Ian A. Laird et al. eds., 2016) (“[A]ccording 
to another view, . . . BITs contain lex specialis that is applicable to all cases of expropriation.”). 
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ary law as lex generalis, which would allow for full reparation in the place 
of compensation.74 
The finding that the customary international law standard of full repa-
ration applies instead of the treaty standard of compensation in cases of un-
lawful expropriations may have important consequences on the amount of 
damages awarded. In recent cases, arbitral tribunals did not hesitate, upon a 
finding that the reparation standard should apply, to award damages based on 
the valuation at the date of the award instead of fair market value at the date 
of the expropriation, thus awarding more in damages.75 This trend is not the 
majority approach in light of the many other ISDS cases where the tribunal 
chose to conduct the valuation at the date of the expropriation.76 This trend, 
is notable, however, because of its upward effect on the total damages 
awarded.77 
GECs may play a key role in the future to prevent such an upward effect 
on total damages awarded. GECs, where found applicable, could prevent ar-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on 
the Argentine Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award, ¶¶ 189–190 (June 29, 2010) 
(“In the present case, where the BIT provides the relevant treaty language, it is necessary first and 
foremost to apply the provisions of the BIT. Indeed, the Parties are in agreement that the BIT 
constitutes the applicable law. . . . Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ lists ‘international conven-
tions’ as a primary source of international law. It is not, however, primarily for this reason that the 
BIT has pre-eminence in the investor-state context of arbitration, but because the consent to sub-
mit to international dispute resolution is predicated on the very terms of the BIT.”). 
 75 See, e.g., Burlington Res. Inc., ¶ 326; Quiborax S.A., ¶¶ 370–371; ConocoPhillips Petrozu-
ata B.V., ¶ 401 (in which the tribunal accepted the principle that the award should be valued at the 
time of the tribunal’s decision but did not reach decision on quantum); ADC Affiliate Ltd. ¶¶ 496–
497, 499; Yukos Universal Ltd., ¶¶ 1763, 1766–1767. In Siemens A.G., although the tribunal de-
cided that ex post information could be used in the valuation, it eventually proceeded to a damage 
calculation based on the information available at date of expropriation. See Siemens A.G, ¶¶ 377, 
379, 385. 
 76 See Quiborax S.A., Partially Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Stern, ¶¶ 43–44; see also MARK 
KANTOR, VALUATION FOR ARBITRATION 60, 65–66 (2008) (“By far, the common legal approach to 
calculating compensation values the impact of the injury as of the date of the harm. That approach, 
therefore, disregards events subsequent to the injury, whether positive of negative.”). 
 77 This Essay does not seek to assess the legal merit of the different valuation approaches. For 
arguments in favor of a valuation at date of award using hindsight, see Manuel A. Abdala, Chor-
zów’s Standard Rejuvenated—Assessing Damages in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 25 J. INT’L 
ARB. 103, 111 (“In indirect expropriation and unjust treatment cases . . . it is often highly difficult 
for a panel to assess the precise measure . . . that triggered relevant loss in value. It is equally dif-
ficult to determine the expectations of the relevant players concerning the evolution of key varia-
bles at the time(s) the investment was affected . . . . In those cases, using ex post information on 
the evolution of these key variables may turn out to be the most reasonable assumption about the 
parties’ ex ante information. The passage of time permits a direct insight and a more accurate 
representation as to the extent of the harm, and thus of the quantum of the damage.”). Contra 
Beharry, supra note 73, at 215 (“[T]here are legal and economic reasons to doubt the soundness of 
valuations based on the date of the award. The use of hindsight can create unbalanced and arbi-
trary outcomes and distorted incentives.”). 
2018] Avoiding Obsolescence of International Investment Agreements 2893 
bitral tribunals from applying the full reparation standard in cases of unlawful 
expropriation. It is doubtful that an exception clause would permit host states 
to completely avoid payment of compensation. In cases where expropriation 
is deemed unlawful because no compensation is paid, or because the expro-
priation is not in the public interest,78 however, the exception clause could 
lead tribunals to reduce the damages awarded, applying as a ceiling the fair 
market value of the investment at the date of the expropriation. 
III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ARBITRAL PRACTICE  
AND A PATH FORWARD 
The hurdles GECs faced as well as the scarcity of investment tribunals 
that have had the opportunity to apply them show the need to design more 
effective mechanisms. 
GECs provide very limited room for host states to implement measures 
in the public interest. Namely, GECs may play a role in preventing: (i) the 
implementation of a broad interpretation of the FET standard including the 
protection of the legitimate expectations of the investor; and (ii) the award 
by tribunals of full reparations under customary international law, thereby 
inflating the amount paid to the investor. Although these two outcomes may 
prove non-negligible in the future, relying on general exceptions to achieve 
these results might not be the most effective path, for several reasons. 
First, general exceptions are difficult to implement. Not only does the 
arbitral case law suggest that tribunals tend to apply exceptions narrowly,79 
but the two-pronged test GECs contain creates an additional hurdle for in-
vestment tribunals.80 In this regard, the tribunal’s reluctance in the 2016 
PCA case, Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, to provide an interpreta-
tion of the applicable GEC, is telling.81 Although it might seem evident that 
arbitrary measures of a host state—qualified by the Copper Mesa Mining 
Corp. tribunal as “unreasonable” and “disproportionate” conduct—fall into 
the category of “arbitrary or unjustifiable” measures under the “chapeau,” 
                                                                                                                           
 78 As previously explained, the “chapeau” of GECs is likely to prevent such finding in expro-
priation cases where the measure is either discriminatory or constituting a violation of due process 
principles. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 79 Newcombe, supra note 41, at 361–62. Even when tribunals interpret specific clauses in 
light of the treaty’s object and purpose, this object and purpose is often limited to investment pro-
tection and promotion, and thus narrowly construed as well. See id. 
 80 See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 1, at 504 (discussing the two-pronged test for 
GECs). 
 81 See Copper Mesa Mining Corp., ¶ 6.84. 
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one would have expected the tribunal to at least elaborate on the threshold 
or definition of these terms.82 
Second, the closed list of general exceptions that could excuse an oth-
erwise unlawful behavior is generally construed narrowly and imported—
often only in part—from trade law, with limited relevance to the issues 
raised in ISDS proceedings dealing with the movement of capital and in-
vestment activities. Such a list drastically reduces the scope and potential 
impact of the general exceptions given that the measure at issue needs to fit 
in one of the specific categories listed. 
Third, GECs create uncertainty. The determination of what constitutes 
an “arbitrary” or “unjustified” behavior is not only uncertain, but it also rests 
fully in tribunals’ hands. The interpretation by arbitral tribunals of such broad 
notions remains unpredictable, which is not the result sought by implement-
ing such a provision. The finding of the Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic 
of Peru tribunal, which inferred from the applicable GEC that no other excep-
tions from general international law or otherwise—including the police pow-
ers theory—could be considered applicable,83 is revealing in that respect. 
Finally, GECs face additional hurdles applied by investment tribunals 
to limit the implementation of other types of exceptions and carve-out 
mechanisms. For instance, the implementation of GECs could be prevented 
through the application of a MFN clause, if the claimant seeks the applica-
tion of a more favorable IIA signed by the host state (i.e. not containing 
such an exception).84 Moreover, tribunals have applied a good faith re-
quirement to deny the application of a treaty carve-out in certain circum-
stances, even if such requirement was not expressly construed by the appli-
cable IIA. For instance, in the context of the taxation carve-out of the Ener-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See id. 
 83 Bear Creek Mining Corp., ¶¶ 473–474. The tribunal inferred from the applicable GEC that:  
[T]he list [contained in the GEC] is not introduced by any wording (e.g. “such as”) 
which could be understood that it is only exemplary. It must therefore be understood 
to be an exclusive list. Also in substance, in view of the very detailed provisions of 
the FTA regarding expropriation . . . and regarding exceptions in Article 2201 ex-
pressly designated to ‘Chapter Eight (Investment),” the interpretation of the FTA 
must lead to the conclusion that no other exceptions from general international law 
or otherwise can be considered applicable in this case . . . . There is, thus, no need to 
enter into the discussion between the Parties regarding the jurisprudence concerning 
any police power exception for measures addressed to investments. 
Id. 
 84 As pointed by the Working Group on Trade and Investment Law Reform, treaty negotiators 
will need to consider whether to “limit[] the potential effects of Most Favored Nation clauses to 
eviscerate more modern IIAs . . .” in the future. See Garcia & Escarcena, supra note 9. 
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gy Charter Treaty,85 the Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Rus-
sian Federation tribunal found that the carve-out could only apply to “bona 
fide taxation measures,” thereby upholding jurisdiction over the challenged 
measures, in light of the “extraordinary circumstances of th[e] case.”86 Alt-
hough the Yukos award was eventually set aside,87 subsequent tribunals did 
not take long to follow the same approach.88 
In light of the obstacles facing GECs, a more effective way to achieve 
the results explained above could be to narrow the scope of the standards of 
protection themselves, either by narrowing the scope of a given provision, 
such as the FET standard,89 or by altering certain of their components, such 
as establishing the fair market value at the date of expropriation as a ceiling 
for recovery in cases of unlawful expropriations. This targeted approach 
provides, ex ante, more predictability to host states and foreign investors in 
the evaluation of their policies or investment decisions and, ex post, less 
uncertainty for investment tribunals assessing the lawfulness of a specific 
state conduct. Altering the scope of the standards themselves, instead of 
using general exceptions as a way to get around them, bears another im-
portant consequence. With altered standards, state conduct that would oth-
erwise have been found unlawful under an IIA would not be merely justi-
                                                                                                                           
 85 ECT, supra note 21, art. 21(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Article, nothing in 
this Treaty shall create rights or impose obligations with respect to Taxation Measures of the Con-
tracting Parties. In the event of any inconsistency between this Article and any other provision of 
the Treaty, this Article shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.”). 
 86 Yukos Universal Ltd., ¶ 1407 (“Secondly, the Tribunal finds that, in any event, the carve-
out of Article 21(1) can apply only to bona fide taxation actions, i.e., actions that are motivated by 
the purpose of raising general revenue for the State. By contrast, actions that are taken only under 
the guise of taxation, but in reality, aim to achieve an entirely unrelated purpose (such as the de-
struction of a company or the elimination of a political opponent) cannot qualify for exemption 
from the protection standards of the ECT under the taxation carve-out in Article 21(1). As a con-
sequence, the Tribunal finds that it does indeed have ‘direct’ jurisdiction over claims under Article 
13 (as well as Article 10) in the extraordinary circumstances of this case.”). 
 87 Hague District Court, Judgment of 20 April 2016, ¶¶ 5.96–5.97. 
 88 See, e.g., Novenergia II–Energy & Env’t (SCA), SICAR v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case 
No. V2015/063, Final Award, ¶ 521–522 (Feb. 15, 2018); Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands, BV v. 
Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. V2013/153, Award, ¶ 729 (July 12, 2016) (both finding the 
carve-out applicable only to the extent the measure was issued in good faith, noting, however, that 
the burden of proving bad faith was on claimant); see also Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Kingdom of 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Award, ¶ 268 (May 4, 2017). 
 89 In fact, more recent IIAs tend to contain more detailed FET provisions. See, e.g., The Com-
prehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Can-E.U., art. 8.10(2), Oct. 30, 2016, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf [https://perma.cc/CEB7-CXWP] 
(containing a closed list of the measures that can constitute a breach of the obligation of fair and 
equitable treatment, thereby limiting the need to invoke to general exceptions). For an analysis of 
the opportunity of inserting exceptions in IIAs, as opposed to framing the relevant substantive 
obligations in a more precise manner, see generally Caroline Henckels, Should Investment Trea-
ties Contain Public Policy Exceptions?, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2825 (2018). 
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fied by an exception clause, but instead perfectly lawful under the stand-
ard’s altered scope, without shifting the burden of proof to the respondent 
with respect to the exception relied upon for its defense. This is a more effi-
cient result for host states seeking to implement public policies, provided 
that those policies do not amount to an abuse of rights. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there is a risk that GECs undermine the objectives of 
IIAs, without solving the underlying tension between the host states’ do-
mestic regulatory framework and traditional standards of protection sub-
scribed by host states under international law. The inclusion of more bal-
anced treaty provisions, however, provides more coherence to the interna-
tional investment legal framework. They promote coherence by incorporat-
ing public concerns directly in the text of agreements and mitigating the 
asymmetry of IIAs,90 without drastically impacting the structure and im-
plementation of these agreements. 
The development of these new provisions raises interpretation chal-
lenges, as it may be the case with any innovative mechanism. Policymakers 
have not yet successfully designed treaty mechanisms enabling host states 
to foster legitimate environmental and social policies without the fear of 
future ISDS challenges, and that would prevent abusive challenges against 
measures promoting public policy and sustainable development objectives, 
and limit the opportunities for protectionist or abusive measures by host 
states. GECs are, in their current form, a source of uncertainty rather than 
coherence and their impact on tribunals in their implementation of the tradi-
tional standards of protection is limited. The ongoing development of more 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See, e.g., Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi, ¶¶ 387, 440, 445–446, 458. The tribunal noted that: 
[T]he US-Oman FTA places a high premium on environmental protection. It is un-
controversial that general principles of customary international law must be applied 
in the context of the express provisions of the Treaty. In the present case, Article 
10.10 [the applicable GEC] expressly qualifies the construction of the other provi-
sions of Chapter 10, including Article 10.5 [on the minimum standard of treatment]. 
The wording of Article 10.10 provides a forceful protection of the right of either 
State Party to adopt, maintain or enforce any measure to ensure that investment is 
“undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns,” provided it is not 
otherwise inconsistent with the express provisions of Chapter 10. 
(emphasis added). Id. ¶ 387. It also held that “[i]t bears repeating that Article 10.10 and Chapter 
17 of the US-Oman FTA [entitled ‘Environment’], establish that a high threshold must be 
breached in the enforcement of a State’s environmental laws and regulations before it can be con-
sidered a violation of Chapter 10 [on investment protection].” Id. ¶ 458. See Camille Martini, 
supra note 21, at 557–82 (discussing the trend among treaty negotiators towards more balanced 
IIAs). 
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detailed standards of protection as well as other types of provisions, such as 
references in the treaty’s preamble to the sustainable development objec-
tives of IIAs, does nonetheless represent a necessary step in the quest for a 
more transparent and sustainable model for investor-state dispute resolu-
tion. 
   
 
